Regulation and Investment by Alberto Alesina et al.












We would like to thank Frank Gollop and participants at seminars at Boston College, Brandeis and IGIER
Bocconi for useful comments. Alesina is grateful for financial support to the NSF for a grant through the
NBER. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the institutions to which they are affiliated or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli.  All rights
reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission
provided that full credit including ©notice, is given to the source.Regulation and Investment
Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli




One commonly held view about the difference between continental European countries and other
OECD economies, especially the United States, is that the heavy regulation of Europe reduces its
growth. Using newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many OECD countries, we
provide substantial and robust evidence that various measures of regulation in the product market,
concerning in particular entry barriers, are negatively related to investment. The implications of our
analysis are clear: regulatory reforms, especially those that liberalize entry, are very likely to spur
investment.
Alberto Alesina Silvia Ardagna





Giuseppe Nicoletti Fabio Schiantarelli
OECD Boston College Regulation and Investment
Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Fabio Schiantarelli∗




One commonly held view about the difference between continental Eu-
ropean countries and other OECD economies, especially the United States,
is that the heavy regulation of Europe reduces its growth. Using newly as-
sembled data on regulation in several sectors of many OECD countries, we
provide substantial and robust evidence that various measures of regulation
in the product market, concerning in particular entry barriers, are negatively
related to investment. The implications of our analysis are clear: regulatory
reforms, especially those that liberalize entry, are very likely to spur invest-
ment.
1 Introduction
In the past decade the rate of GDP growth has been remarkably different amongst
OECD countries. One of the most striking and often cited comparison is the one
between the US with a 4.3 percent average GDP growth in the second half of the
nineties and large continental European economies (Germany, Italy and France)
with 2 percent average growth. One commonly held explanation of these differ-
ences is that a stricter regulation of markets has prevented faster growth in many
European countries especially in a period, the nineties, of rapid technological in-
novation. Is this true? This paper suggests that the answer is ￿yes￿: various mea-
sures of product market regulation are negatively related to investment, which is,
of course, an important engine of growth.
∗We would like to thank Frank Gollop and participants at seminars at Boston College, Brandeis
and IGIER Bocconi for useful comments. Alesina is grateful for ￿nancial support to the NSF for
a grant through the NBER. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent those of the institutions to which they are af￿liated.
1In the last decade or so, most OECD countries have experienced some form of
regulatory reforms (deregulation for short) implying entry liberalization and pri-
vatization. However, the timing, extent, nature, and starting point varies across
countries. For instance, the United States started deregulating earlier, already in
the seventies. In 1977, 17 per cent of the US GNP was produced by fully regulated
industries, and by 1988 this total had been cut to 6.6 percent of GNP.1 Other early
and decisive reformers have been New Zealand and Britain, while laggards have
been Italy and France.
We rely on these diverse histories to study the effects of regulatory reforms
in sectors which were traditionally most heavily sheltered from competition and
have witnessed, at different times and to different degrees, some form of dereg-
ulation and privatization in various countries. Speci￿cally, we look at the effects
of regulation on investment in the transport (airlines, road freight and railways),
communication (telecommunications and postal) and utilities (electricity and gas)
sectors. We measure regulation with different time varying indicators that capture
entry barriers and the extent of public ownership, among other things.
We ￿ndthatregulatoryreformshavehadasigni￿cantpositiveimpactoncapital
accumulation in the transport, communication, and utilities industries. In particu-
lar, liberalization of entry in potentially competitive markets seems to have had
the largest and most signi￿cant impact on private investment.2 The effect of pri-
vatization is less clear-cut. On the one hand privatization may lead to more pro￿t
opportunities for private ￿rms; on the other hand public enterprises may overinvest
if they pursue political objectives and/or if managers are not constrained by the dis-
cipline imposed by capital markets. There is also evidence that the marginal effect
of deregulation on investment is greater when the policy reform is large and when
changes occur starting from already lower levels of regulation. In other words,
small changes in a heavy regulated environment are not likely to produce much of
an effect.
Much of the literature on the effects of regulation in OECD countries is con-
cerned with the labor market, see for instance, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
Work on the macroeconomic effects of goods market is more limited.3 Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2001) develop an insightful model of both labor market and product
1See Winston (1993). The ￿gures are from the January 1991 Survey of Current Business.
2Ourconclusionthatlessintrusivegovernmentinterventionfavorsprivateinvestmentisconsistent
with the ￿nding by Alesina et al. (2002). They showin a panel of OECD countries that a reduction of
the size of government measured by total spending over GDP and total taxation increases the private
accumulation of capital. Results by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) speci￿c a l l yo nt h eU Sa r eo nt h e
same line.
3There is of course a vast literature on the microeconomics of regulation and deregulation. See
for instance the survey by Joskow and Rose (1989) and Winston (1993).
2market regulation and their interconnection. Nicoletti et al. (2001a, b) provide
empirical evidence in favor of a negative effect of anti-competitive product market
regulation on employment in a panel of OECD countries. Moreover, Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2002) ￿nd that product market regulation lowers multifactor productiv-
ity growth in OECD countries, while Bassanini and Ernst (2002) ￿nd a negative
effect of regulation on R&D. Finally, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and
Shleifer (2002) focus on regulations that affect how easy it is to start a business in
85 countries. Their paper contrasts developing countries with developed ones and
lends support to the view of excessive regulation as a hindrance to entrepreneur-
ship.4 To our knowledge, there are no contributions in the literature that use broad
time varying measures of product market regulation and look at the relationship
between regulatory reforms and investment in a panel context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to il-
lustrate the channels through which regulation can affect capital accumulation.
Section 3 describes our data and, in particular, the measurement of the regulatory
environment. Section 4 discusses our results in sectors (utilities, telecommunica-
tion, transport) which were heavily regulated and have experienced various forms
of deregulation. The last section concludes.
2 ProductMarketRegulationandInvestment: SomeThe-
ory
Product market regulation can in￿uence investment in several ways. First, as Blan-
chard and Giavazzi (2001) emphasize in a non-competitive model of employment
determination, changes in regulation affect the markup of prices over marginal
costs, because of their impact, for instance, on entry barriers and, hence, on the
number of ￿rms. Second, regulation can in￿uence the costs that even existing
￿rms face when expanding their productive capacity. For example, red tape and
other forms of regulatory burdens can increase ￿rms￿ costs of adjusting the capital
stock and hamper their capacity to react to changes in fundamentals. Third, for cer-
tain sectors, regulation imposes a ceiling on the rate of return on capital that ￿rms
are allowed to earn; this affects the demand for capital relative to labor (Averch
and Johnson (1962)). Finally, if product markets regulatory reforms occur together
with privatization (or nationalization) policies, changes in ownership structure can
also affect investment.
4A related literature asks the question whether competition stimulates ￿rms￿ productivity. See,
for instance, Nickell (1996) who shows that both the level and growth rates of ￿rms￿ productivity are
positively affected by measures of competition. This suggests that regulatory reforms should have
positive productivity effects, insofar as they succeed in stimulating competition.
3We begin by embedding the ￿rst two ideas in a standard model of investment
with imperfect competition in the output market.5 We then discuss the effect of
regulation that imposes a ceiling on the rate of return on capital and the effect of a
reduction in the importance of public enterprises.
2.1 Regulation, the markup and adjustment costs
We assume that each monopolistic competitive ￿rm produces a differentiated prod-














where Y is average real output demanded, P the average price level, and ε the
elasticity of demand.6 As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), we assume that the
elasticity of demand varies inversely with the degree of product market regulation:
tighter regulation is associated with a lower elasticity. One way to rationalize this
is to assume that the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the number
of ￿rms, m. Hence, ε = g(m),w h e r eg
 
(•)>0.7 If we de￿ne the markup of prices






,t h e n￿ is a decreasing function of the
number of ￿rms (￿ = ￿(g(m)),w i t h￿
 
< 0).
We begin by assuming that the regulatory authority (the government for short)
determines administratively the number of￿rms. In this case, deregulation of prod-
uct markets leads to a larger number of ￿rms, hence, a decrease in ￿. In the next
section, we let instead the number of ￿rms to be endogenously determined by a
standard entry condition, but entry is costly and regulation determines the size of
5In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) output is a function of employment only. The focus of this
paper is on product and labor market regulation. We abstract from non-competitive labor markets
and from labor market regulation, but we endogeneize the capital stock. See also Spector (2002).
6If the demand functions are derived from Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, P has the standard CES
form.
7Other aspects of regulation may also affect the elasticity of demand, for any given m.F o ri n -
stance, changes in tariff and non tariff barriers may affect the availability of foreign products on
domestic markets and, hence, the elasticity of demand. Similarly, the latter will be affected by the
introduction of common standards across countries. A simple way to modify the model to account
for such effects would be to write, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) do, ε = εg(m),w h e r eg
 
(•)>0
and ε captures the aspects of product market regulation mentioned above. Since we do not focus on
changes in trade barriers or on the introduction of common standards, we will continue with our sim-
pler speci￿cation. Finally, note also that an inverse relation between the markup and the number of
￿rmscanbeobtainedinavarietyofmodelsanddoesnot require a model with product differentiation.
For instance, it holds in a model with Cournot competition and homogenoeous products.
4such costs. Firms choose capital and labor to maximize the present discounted




















where Ki, Li,and Ii denotecapital,laborandinvestment,respectively. F(Ki, Li)
is linear and homogeneous in Ki and Li with decreasing returns to each factor, W






Ki )2Ki. We assume that product market regulation also affects b;i np a r -
ticular, deregulation decreases it. With this we capture the reduction in the shadow
and actual costs ￿of doing business￿ associated with red tape and other administra-
tive impediments that hamper ￿rms￿ choices. The maximization problem is subject
to the goods￿ demand function (1) and to the capital accumulation equation:
.
Ki = Ii − δKi (3)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that r is exogenous, as in a small open
economy, and constant.9 W ec a nt h e ne a s i l yd e r i v et h e￿rst order conditions for
labor, investment and the capital stock. Imposing the symmetric equilibrium so
that Pi = P, substituting the ￿rst order condition for investment into the ￿rst order
condition for capital and in equation (3) and rearranging, we obtain:
f (k) − kf
 






(q − 1) − δ
’
k (5)
8Note that we are assuming constant return to scale. Some industries may be regulated because
they display natural monopoly characteristics due to the presence of increasing returns. We can
easily model increasing returns following Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) by using the production
function F(Ki, Li) −   with F(Ki, Li) displaying constant returns, and   representing a positive
constant determined by technology only and capturing ￿xed costs. Note that since the ￿rst order
conditions and the equations of motion remain unaltered the conclusions obtained in section 2.1
would be unchanged.
9Note that many of our countries are indeed small open economies. Another way of closing
the model is to consider explicitly the consumption choice of individuals, as in Abel and Blanchard
(1983). This complicates the model, without providing additional insights for the purpose at hand.
5•
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where ki = Ki/Li,w= W/P and we have dropped subscript i since all ￿rms
behave identically in equilibrium. Equations (5) and (6) determine the equilibrium
path for the capital-labor ratio, k, and the shadow value of capital, q,f o rag i v e n
￿ and b. Also, given the assumption of a ￿xed labor supply, L, equations (5) and
(6) determine the equilibrium level of the aggregate capital stock as K = kL.T h e
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Equation (7) implies that an unanticipated permanent increase in the number of
￿rms allowed to operate generates a decrease in the markup, ￿, and leads (ceteris
paribus) to an increase in the steady state value of k (since f
  
(k) is negative), i.e.
∂k/∂m > 0. Following the decrease in ￿, the shadow value of capital jumps up,
leading to an increase in the investment rate until the new steady state is reached.
Similarly, for given ￿, a decrease in the adjustment cost parameter b leads to an
increase in the steady state level of k,i . e .∂k/∂b > 0. In response to a regulatory
reform that decreases the cost of adjusting the capital stock, the shadow value of
capital initially jumps up and then it settles to a lower steady state value. Moreover,
￿rms￿ investment is now more responsive to the marginal pro￿tability of capital.
Hence, the capital stock increases in the long-run.
In conclusion, deregulation, by decreasing￿or b or both, leadsto an expansion
of the capital stock and investment through both the markup and the adjustment
cost channel. Using the previous results and the ￿rst order condition of the ￿rm
with respect to labor (4), one can show that the real wage decreases in ￿ and b. A
decrease in the markup or in the adjustment cost parameter leads to a higher capital
stock and, hence, to a higher marginal product of labor. Moreover, the markup also
acts as a tax on the use of labor, at each level of ki. Hence, a decrease in ￿ leads
to a higher labor demand and, given a ￿xed labor supply, to a higher equilibrium
wage.10
10Note that in the Blanchard and Giavazzi￿s (2001) model, there is an inverse relationship between
the real wage and the markup as well. Exogenous decreases in the markup lead to a higher real wage
also in the dynamic general equilibrium model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) who allow for a
variable labor supply and capital accumulation. Investment also increases, following a decrease in
the markup.
62.2 Regulation and entry: endogenizing the number of ￿rms
Up to this point, we have assumed that the government can mandate the number
of ￿r m si nt h em a r k e t . I ti sm o r er e a l i s tic to assume that the number of ￿rms is
endogenously determined and can only be indirectly affected by the government
through regulation of entry. Firms entry and exit the market and the number of



















dt = cKi (8)
where cKi measures entry costs, established by regulation and assumed to be
proportional to capital. Note that the model￿s qualitative conclusions on the ef-
fect of regulation on investment do not change if we assume that entry costs are



















In steady state Ii = δKi,a n ddV/dt = 0. Hence, given the linear homogeneity
of F(Ki, Li), in the symmetric equilibrium, we can rewrite the entry condition that







)k = rck (10)
From the ￿rst order condition for labor (4), the wage is a function of k.M o r e o v e r ,
k is an implicit function of ￿, hence m,a n db through (7), i.e. k = k(￿(g(m)),b),
with km > 0a n dkb < 0. Therefore, (10) determines implicitly the number of ￿rms
as a function of entry costs, c, the adjustment cost parameter b, the depreciation
rate δ, the interest rate r,a n dt h e￿xed labor supply, L.
The effect of a change in entry costs on investment can be decomposed in: a)
the impact of entry costs on the number of ￿rms and b) the effect of the number
of ￿rms on the capital stock, i.e. ∂k/∂c = (∂k/∂m)(∂m/∂c). W eh a v ea l r e a d y
shown above that ∂k/∂m > 0, hence we need to determine the sign of ∂m/∂c.
One can check that, without further assumptions, the sign of ∂m/∂c is ambiguous.
If F(Ki, Li) is Cobb-Douglas with an elasticity of output with respect to capital
equal to α, it is possible to show that a suf￿cient condition for deregulation to lead
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(11)
7This condition is almost surely satis￿ed for reasonable parameters combina-
tions, so that a decrease in entry costs generates an increase in the number of ￿rms,
a decrease in the markup, and an increase in the capital stock. For instance, for
α = 0.35, r = 0.02, δ = 0.06, b = 10, ∂m/∂c is negative if the markup ￿ is lower
than 157%. Thus, a reduction in entry costs leads to an increase in the number of
￿rms and a lower mark up.11
Let￿s now consider the steady state effect of a change in the adjustment cost
parameter, allowing for a change in the equilibrium number of￿rms that may occur
as a result of variations in b. In the long-run with m variable, the total effect is
dk/db = (∂k/∂b) + (∂k/∂m)(∂m/∂b). As shown above, deregulation captured
by a decrease in b has a positive effect on the capital stock, for a given m,s i n c e
∂k/∂b < 0. Also, (∂k/∂m) > 0. However, it is not possible to sign ∂m/∂b,
and, hence, the total effect, without additional assumptions. Again, some algebra
leads us to conclude that, under a Cobb-Douglas technology, the condition in (11)
guarantees that dk/db < 0. Hence, also in this case, a regulatory reform that
decreases the cost for the ￿rm to adjust their capacity leads to a higher level of the
capital stock in the long-run.
The general conclusion that can be derived from the models we have analyzed
so far is that deregulation of product markets has a positive effect on capital accu-
mulation if it generates a reduction in the markup of prices over marginal costs (for
instance through a reduction in entry barriers) or if it lowers costs of adjusting the
capital stock.
2.3 Two additional channels
Regulation can affect investment through two additional channels. The ￿rst chan-
nel is operative when regulation imposes a ceiling on the rate of return on capital
invested in some sectors. If the constraint binds, the choice of factor proportion
may be altered in favor of more capital intensive techniques and the amount of cap-
ital used increases relative to the one chosen in the absence of constraints. This is
the well know argument due originally to Averch and Johnson (1962) and re￿ned,
subsequently, by other authors.12 The basic idea is that by investing in additional
capital, ￿r m si n c r e a s et h eb a s et ow h i c ht h e( c o n s trained) rate of return is applied,
resulting in a greater total remuneration for capital. The consequence is that re-
11If the production function is F(Ki, Li) −  , in order to allow for increasing returns, the term
− m
L shouldbeincludedonthelhsof(10)makingmorelikelythatadecreaseinentrycostsincreases
m. The suf￿cient condition in (11) remains unchanged.
12See also Takayama (1969) and Baumol and Klevorick (1970). The relevance of the Averch-
Johnson model has been debated empirically, typically in the power generating sector, with mixed
results. See, for instance, Petersen (1975) and Boyes (1976).
8duction in the rate of return on capital below the pro￿t maximizing level (resulting
from the imposition of a binding ceiling) le a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec a p i t a ls t o c k .
The lower the allowed rate of return is, the greater is the capital stock employed
by the ￿rm.13 Removing the binding constraint would, instead, reduce the desired
capital stock and therefore investment.
The second argument has to do with the presence of public or semi-public en-
terprises, which in many countries accounted for a large fraction of production in
some sectors such as utilities and transport, and also in the manufacturing sector.
Product market regulatory reforms that have taken place in the last decades have
often been accompanied by privatization. The disappearing or reduced importance
of a dominant publicly owned player, facing a soft budget constraint, is one of
the reasons why deregulation has lead to a decrease in entry barriers for new pri-
vately owned ￿rms. The model with entry costs we have analyzed above captures
therefore the shrinking role of public enterprises if we think of cKi as a shadow
cost.
However, public enterprises may have been heavy investors because of a po-
litical mandate imposed on them or because of their managers￿s incentives. Man-
agers of public enterprises often behave as empire builders, because their reward in
terms of monetary compensation, power, and perks may be related to the size of
the organization. It is also unlikely that capital markets can effectively restrict this
type of behavior. Alternatively, their objective may be to maximize political sup-
port, and this may lead to set prices below the pro￿t maximizing level (Peltzman
(1971)). Thus, one may have overexpansion and over-investment in public enter-
prises, so that with privatization total investment might fall. In order to disentangle
the multifaceted effects of privatization one would need a break down of data on
an internationally comparable basis of investment by sectors and by type of ￿rm:
private, private with public participation, public, etc. Unfortunately, these data are
not available. Therefore, if total investment increases after a policy change that
implies both privatization and a lowering of entry barriers, it may mean that the in-




which imply reduction in entry barriers or in the markup tend to lead to an increase
13One can obtain similar predictions if the regulatory authority sets directly the (relative) prices
￿rms can charge and mandates that ￿rms satisfy all demand at those prices. If prices are set below
the (monopoly) maximizing prices output demanded would rise relative to the unconstrained case.
As a result the demand of both capital and labor would be higher, for given factor prices.
9in investment. Aspects of deregulation that remove binding constraints on rates of
return or imply privatization of public or semi-public enterprises may determine
a reduction of investment. In the end, the answer has to be found empirically.
The previous discussion will guide us in what aspects of deregulation should have
w h i c he f f e c to ni n v e s t m e n t .
3T h e D a t a
For our empirical assessment of the effects of product market regulation we use
time varying measures of regulation for several non manufacturing industries in
OECD countries, for which investment, capital and value added data are also avail-
able. In the two next subsections we describe in detail the construction of the main
variables used in estimation.
3.1 The Industry-Level Regulation Data
In order to capture the intensity of regulation, we use data collected and described
by Nicoletti et al. (2000), who extended the cross-sectional data contained in
the OECD International Regulation Database. These data are used to construct
time-series indicators of overall regulation, barriers to entry and public ownership
from 1975 to 1996 in 21 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, US, New Zealand) for
seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity and gas supply (generation, trans-
mission, distribution), road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post (ba-
sic letter, basic parcel and express mail) and telecommunications (￿xed and mo-
bile). The regulatory indicators measure on a scale from 0 to 6 (from least to most
restrictive) restrictions on competition and private governance.
The summary index of regulation includes information on entry barriers, pub-
lic ownership, the market share of new entrants (in the telephone, gas and railroad
sectors), and price controls (in the road freight industry). Entry barriers cover le-
gal limitations on the number of companies in potentially-competitive markets and
rules on vertical integration of network industries. The barriers to entry indicator
takes a value of 0 when entry is free (i.e.: a situation with three or more competi-
tors and with complete ownership separation of natural monopoly and competitive
segments of the industry) and a value of 6 when entry is severely restricted (i.e.:
situations with legal monopoly and full vertical integration in network industries
or restrictive licensing in other industries). Intermediate values represent partial
liberalization of entry (e.g. legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural
10monopoly and competitive segments). Public ownership measures the share of eq-
uity owned by central or municipal governments in ￿rms of a given sector. The
two polar cases are no public ownership (0 value of the indicator) and full public
ownership (a value of 6 for the indicator). Whenever data are available (i.e. mainly
for network industries), intermediate values of the public ownership indicator are
calculated as an increasing function of the actual share of equity held by the gov-
ernment in the dominant ￿rm. In some cases (e.g. the energy industries), a simple
three-pronged scale is used pointing to full or majority control by the government
(a value of 6), mixed public/private ownership (a value of 3), marginal public share
or full private ownership (a value of 0).14
The construction of the indicators involved the following steps. First, separate
indicators for barriers to entry, public ownership, market share of new entrants, and
price controls were created at the ￿nest available level of industry disaggregation
(e.g. production, transmission and distribution of electricity and gas; mobile and
￿xed telephony; letter, parcel and express mail). Second, these indicators were
aggregated at the industry level taking simple averages or revenue-weighted aver-
ages (when aggregating horizontal segments of industries, such as mobile and ￿xed
telephony). Third, the index of overall regulation is obtained by averaging in each
of the seven industries the indicators of barriers to entry, public ownership, market
share of new entrants, and price controls. Finally, we used simple averaging of the
indices to reach the level of industry aggregation for which investment and value
added data are available. More speci￿cally, we have aggregated the regulation in-
dices for the seven sectors in the three broader sectors: utilities (electricity and
gas), communication (telecommunications and post), and transportation (airlines,
road freight and railways).
In our regressions we use four different indicators of regulation: REGOL,
the overall indicator including all the regulation dimensions; REGNO,w h i c hi n -
cludes all dimensions except public ownership; BEVI , which summarizes barri-
ers to entry (comprising legal restrictions and vertical integration), and REGPO,
which includes only public ownership information. The reason for isolating the
effect of public ownership is that, in principle, public ownership per se does not
imply rules and restrictions that private investors have to follow. However, it is
likely to in￿uence the shadow cost of entry for private ￿rms. Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, investment choices of public enterprises may differ from those of
private ￿rms. The market share of new entrants will not be used individually as
an explanatory variable. It is certainly useful to measure the effectiveness of en-
try liberalization in promoting competition, but, as an outcome variable, it is also
the component most affected by potential endogeneity problems. Finally, we do
14Public ownership is irrelevant in the road freight industry of OECD countries.
11not use the indicator of price controls by itself because data on price controls are
available only for the road freight industry.
Figure 1 plots the level of regulation, as measured by the summary indicator
REGOL, in 1975 and in 1998 on the horizontal and vertical axis respectively.
Countries-sectors differ both in terms of the level of regulation and in terms of
changes in the regulatory environment. All the observations are below the 45 de-
gree line indicating a general trend toward liberalization and privatization. Interest-
ingly, no country except the US had low regulation at the beginning of the sample
in the three broad industry aggregates. The US was the least regulated economy at
the beginning of the sample, was still so in 1998, and implemented strong dereg-
ulation policies over the period. For example, the index measuring the level of
regulation in the US in the transport sector is equal to 4.25 in 1975 and to 0.75
in 1998, a decrease of about 82%. Deregulation has also been particularly strong
in the UK and New Zealand, which were highly regulated at the beginning of the
sample, while they rank among the most ￿market-oriented￿ economies in 1998.
For example, regulation decreased by 86% from 5.5 to 0.75 in the transport sector
in New Zealand and by 78% (from 5.63 to 1.25) and 69% (from 5.08 to 1.58) in
the utilities and communications sectors in the UK. On the contrary, countries like
Italy, France, Greece were among the most regulated economies in 1975 and were
still so in 1998.
The timing of regulatory reforms also differs across countries. Figures 2 and 3
plot the average across all seven non-manufacturing industries of the index BEVI
and REGPO for the following representative countries: US, UK, New Zealand,
Germany, France, Spain and Italy. While the ￿rst three countries reduced entry
barriers starting from the late seventies/early eighties, in Italy and Spain the pro-
cess did not begin till the nineties, and in France and Germany the changes that
occurred during the eighties were minor. The index measuring the extent of pub-
lic ownership points to a generalized trend towards privatization. Once again, the
process has been rather timid in Italy and France and much more decisive in New
Zealand and UK. Note that the US is the only country that does not show a ten-
dency to reduce public enterprises. However, the US had the smallest beginning of
period level of public ownership, much below the level of continental Europe.
3.2 The Other Data
Data on investment, capital stock, and value added at the country-sector-year level
come from the OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, based on the Inter-
national Standard Industrial Classi￿cation of all Economic Activities, Revision 3
(ISIC Rev. 3). This database covers both services and manufacturing sectors for
the following OECD countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark,
12Spain, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and USA, start-
ing from 1970. The non-manufacturing sectors most widely covered by the STAN
database are: (i) electricity, gas and water, (ii) communications and posts, (iii)
transport and storage, and (iv) transport, storage and communications, for coun-
tries in which no separate data for communications and transport is available. From
now on, we will name the sectors de￿ned in (i), (ii), (iii),a n d(iv) utilities, U,
communications, C, transport, T, and transport and communications, TC, respec-
tively. We use the data at the most disaggregated level (sectors U, C, T) whenever
they are available and data for sectors U and TCotherwise.
Our ￿rst panel (PanelA) includes sectors U, C, T for Canada, Germany, Den-
mark, Finland, France, and UK, and sectors U and TCfor Belgium and Italy. This
panel still includes only eight OECD countries. In order to use more information
on regulatory reforms in OECD countries we also construct a second panel (Panel
B), extending our basic panel with data from the OECD￿s International Secto-
rial Database (ISDB). Panel B includes sectors U, C, T for Belgium Canada,
Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Sweden, sectors U and TC for
Australia, and the US, and sector U for Japan.
We merge the data contained in Panel Aand Panel B with the database con-
taining the regulation indices REGOL, REGNO, BEVI,a n dREGPO.A s
mentioned above, because data on investment, capital, and value added are not
available for each single industry for which regulation indices exist, we mapped
the industry-level regulatory indicators into the four non-manufacturing aggregates
covered by our STAN-ISDB industrial statistics database. In the empirical analy-
sis, we analyze the effect of regulation on investment using both Panel A and
Panel B a n dw es h o wt h a to u rr e s u l t sa r er o b u s tt ot h es a m p l ec h o i c e .I n v e s t m e n t
in utilities, transport and communication sectors is about 18% of business invest-
ment in OECD countries, approximately the same share as the one of investment
in the manufacturing sector. Hence, our analysis on the effect of deregulation on
investment is not limited to a trivial component of business sector investment in
OECD countries.
Figure 4 plots the average of investment as a share of the capital stock in the
utility, communications, and transport sectors in the US and UK (selected as the
early and more decisive deregulators) and in the three largest continental European
countries, Italy, France and Germany, (selected as late and timid deregulators). The
pattern of the investment rate in one group of countries is the opposite of the other:
while in US and UK investment as a share of the capital stock increased from
3.7% in 1975 to 8.15% in 1998, in the large continental European countries the
investment rate decreased by 5 percentage points from 9.4% to 4.4%. As shown
in ￿gures 1-3, US and UK strongly liberalized product markets starting in the late
seventies/early eighties, while deregulation reforms were almost absent in Italy,
13France and Germany till the nineties.
4 Investment and Regulation: Econometric Results
We now turn to the econometric evidence on the effect of regulation. We ￿rst
discuss the results in the context of a simple dynamic panel model of investment
and regulation, controlling for common or sector speci￿c year effects. We show
that proxies for regulation, in particular those that capture barriers to entry, have a
signi￿cant negative effect on investment. We then present evidence that our con-
clusions are robust to various extensions and sensitivity checks.
4.1 Basic Speci￿cation
We base our investigation on estimation of various versions of an unrestricted dy-







βηREGijt−s + γ i + δ j + ζt + (or ζ jt) + εijt
(12)
where t represents years, i denotes countries and j sectors. REG is one of
our four indices of regulation described above (REGOL, REGNO, BEVI,a n d
REGPO). The remaining terms capture country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effect,
and common (or sector speci￿c) year dummies. We estimate (12) by OLS.15
In Table 1 we present the results obtained with common year dummies. For
compactness, we report the sum of the coef￿cients of the regulation variable (Sum)
and a test for its equality to zero, which is the most relevant test to assess the long-
r u ne f f e c to fr e g u l a t i o no ni n v e s t m e n t . 16 The value of the long-run multiplier is
also shown in the table. We also report a test on the hypothesis that the coef￿cients
15OLS estimation with country and sector ￿xed effects yields consistent estimates since we have
a panel with large T.
16If we take the simple models of the previous section literally, regulation should not have a long-
run effect on the investment rate, as the latter equals simply the depreciation rate in the steady state.
However, even simple changes would invalidate this result. For instance, if adjustment costs are
speci￿ed as in Uzawa (1969), so that gross investment turns into capital at a decreasing rate, changes
in the adjustment cost parameter associated with deregulation will affect the steady state value of the
investment rate (we have not used this model in the theoretical section because it is more compli-
cated). More fundamentally, it is possible to envision endogenous growth models in whichregulation
may affect the steady state growth rate of the capital stock, and, hence, the investment rate. For this
reason, in our econometric work, we let the data decide whether or not there is a long-run effect of
regulation on the investment rate.
14of the index of regulation are jointly zero. Model 1 is the most general model,
containing the contemporaneous, once lagged, and twice lagged value of the regu-
lation variable. Model 2 restricts the coef￿cient on the contemporaneous value of
the regulation index to be equal to zero, while Model 3 is the most restricted model
as it only includes the once lagged value of the regulation indicator. For Model 2
t h et e s to nt h ej o i n te q u a l i t yt oz e r oo ft h ec o e f ￿cients can be interpreted as a test of
Granger causality (from regulation to investment). We present these three models
to be sure that results are not sensitive to the number of lags of the regulatory index
included in the regression. In particular, the speci￿cations that do not include the
contemporaneous value of the regulatory indicator (Model 2 and Model 3) are less
open to criticisms about the endogeneity of the regulatory index itself.
Table 1 shows a signi￿cant negative effect of regulation on investment: the sum
of the coef￿cients for summary measures of regulation (REGOL and REGNO)
is almost always signi￿cant at the 1% level across models and samples. The nega-
tive effect is due in particular to entry liberalization measures. In fact, while Sum
for the barrier to entry variable (BEVI)i sa l w a y ss i g n i ￿cant at the 1%, Sum for
the measure of public ownership (REGPO) is never signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l .
The test of joint signi￿cance of the coef￿cients presents a similar picture, with
marginal signi￿cance levels between 1% and 5% for REGOL and REGNO and
equal to 1% in most cases for BEVI.A g a i n , t h e c o e f ￿cients for REGPO are
never jointly different from zero at conventional levels. These results are robust to
the exclusion of one country at the time.
In order to have an idea of the size of the effect of changes in regulation on
investment, consider an exogenous unit decrease in REGOL, for Panel A, Model
2. The investment rate increases by 1.1 percentage points in the long-run. Since
the investment rate is approximately equal to 6% on average, this would imply an
increase to 7.1%. Note that if REGOL decreases from its third quartile value
(5.7) to its ￿rst quartile value (3.4), this change generates an increase in the invest-
ment rate of approximately 2.5 percentage points, which is quite large. The same
experiment for BEVI leads to a total increase of 2.4 percentage points (BEVI
changes from 6 to 3.6 going from the third to the ￿rst quartile). Consider also that
the sectors in our panels are highly capital intensive: the capital to gross output
ratio equals approximately 4.2 and the capital to value added ratio equals 6.5. As
a result, the increase of investment as a percentage of gross output or value added
is much larger. The ￿gures for Panel B are somewhat smaller, but still sizeable:
the total increase in the investment rate, following a change in REGOL from the
t h i r dt ot h e￿rst quartile, would now be 1.8 percentage points in the long-run. The
same experiment for BEVI leads to an increase of 1.7 percentage points in the
investment rate.
Another way of gathering a sense of the magnitude of the changes is to make
15some experiments with actual values of the indices in different time periods in
one country or across countries. Consider, for example, the regulatory reforms
implemented in the UK in the transport and communications sector. In the period
1975-1983, the overall index of regulation was constant and equal to 3.75 and the
average value of the investment rate was 4.96 per cent. Starting from 1984, the
index REGOL shows a trend toward deregulation and reaches a value of 0.78 in
the period 1994-1998. Our model predicts an increase in the investment rate in the
long-run of 3.27 percentage points (from 4.96% to 8.23%) using the coef￿cients of
Model 2 Panel A. The actual increase was 3.03 percentage points (from 4.96% to
7.99%).
Lets￿ now compare average values of the regulation indicator REGOL across
countries. For instance, in the period 1994-1998, the average value of REGOL
in the transport and communication sectors is 0.80 in US, 3.42 in Germany and in
France, and 4.57 in Italy. The investment rate is 8.97% in US, 5.6% in Germany,
5.9% in France, and 6.8% in Italy. One can compute that if Germany and France
regulation changes from 3.42 - their own value - to the US one equal to 0.80, Model
2 Panel A predicts an increase in the investment rate by 2.62 percentage points in
the long-run, from Germany￿s average value of 5.6% to 8.22% and from France￿s
average value of 5.9% to 8.52%, much closer to the US average level of 8.97%.
Finally, suppose that regulation in Italy changes from 4.57 - its own value - to the
US one equal to 0.8, the model predicts an increase in the investment rate by 4.15
percentage points, from 6.8 per cent to 10.9 per cent.
In Table 2, which mimics Table 1, we report the results obtained when we
include sector-speci￿c year effects. This set of results is very important because
technological advances, that are likely to have a sector speci￿c component, were
occurring at the same time of regulatory reform. Table 2 shows that, even after
controlling for sector-speci￿c year dummies, the test on Sum still suggests a sig-
ni￿cant negative effect of REGOLand BEVI in both Panel A and Panel B, even
though the results of the test of joint signi￿cance of the coef￿cients are weaker.
However, the value of the long-run coef￿cients are very similar to those obtained
in Table 1. The results on the negative effects of REGNO are now somewhat
weaker, while the ones on the lack of signi￿cance of the share of public ownership
are con￿rmed. These results are consistent with our theoretical discussion, where
we have shown that a reduction in barriers to entry is likely to have a positive effect
on investment because it leads to a reduction of the markup and, possibly, of the
cost associated with capital expansion. However, when it comes to privatization it
is more dif￿cult to predict the direction of its effect on investment.
164.2 Total Investment, Private Investment and Investment by Public
Enterprises
We have shown that deregulation increases total investment, which includes both
private investment and investment by public or semi public enterprises. Ideally we
would like to separate the two, but data limitations do not allow us to do so. Data
for selected countries (and periods) show that investment of public enterprises has
decreased, especially in Europe, probably as a result of tighter budget constraints
faced by public enterprises and of the process of privatization.17 As we discussed
earlier, political mandates imposed on public enterprises and/or their own internal
logic may lead to overinvestment. However, privatization may also generate more
pro￿t opportunities for private ￿rms. As a result, if deregulation of product mar-
ket and privatization of public enterprises are positively correlated and if the ￿rst
(second) effect dominates one may underestimates (overestimates) the impact of
deregulation on private investment. The correlation between our index of public
ownership (REGPO) and the index of all other aspects of the regulatory envi-
ronment excluding public ownership (REGNO) is indeed around 0.6. In order
to control for changes in investment of public enterprises and to assess the direc-
tion of the bias (if any), we have estimated regressions in Table 1 including both
REGPOand BEVI or REGPOand REGNOon the rhs of equation (12). Sum
for REGPO is never signi￿cant at the 5% level and the coef￿cients of REGPO
are not jointly different from zero at conventional levels. Moreover, the signi￿-
cance and size of the effect of BEVI and REGNO on investment is unchanged,
suggesting the absence of any sizable bias. For instance, for Panel A, Model 2,
Sum for the barrier to entry variable (BEVI) is equal to -0.0015 and signi￿cant at
the1%, and an exogenousunit decreasein BEVI leadstoanincrease of theinvest-
ment rate of 0.95 percentage points in the long-run. For the same model in Table 1,
column 3, the sum of the coef￿cients for BEVI is -0.0016 and the long-run effect
of a unit decrease in BEVI on the investment rate is 1 percentage point.
4.3 Controlling for Country Speci￿c Shocks and Sectorial Output
Next we control for country speci￿c shocks. We summarize here the main conclu-
sions. Detailed results are available upon request. More speci￿cally, we have ￿rst
added to the speci￿cations of Table 1 the cyclically-adjusted value of the ratios
between government expenditure and tax revenue to GDP. Alesina et al. (2002)
17For instance in the period 1982-1998 non-agricultaral business investment of public enterprises
went down from about 30 per cent of total non-agricultural business investment to about 10 per cent
in Italy and Portugal and from about 16 per cent to 12 per cent in Germany and Belgium (see CEEP,
various years). See also Bertero and Rondi (2002) for evidence that tighter budget constraints has
led to a decrease in investment by public enterprises in Italy.
17show that public spending, and to a lesser extent taxation, exert a negative effect
on aggregate investment in the context of a Q model. Our basic results are virtu-
ally unchanged with the inclusion of these variables. As an aside, note that public
spending and taxation have a negative, but not signi￿cant effect on the sectorial
investment rates. These results are at least weakly consistent with those of Alesina
et al. (2002).
Second, we have included the GDP-to-capital ratio of the business sector and
the real ex-post interest rate (de￿ned as the nominal long interest rate at time t
minus the in￿ation rate between t+1 and t) and results are virtually unchanged.
Finally, we checked whether results are robust when we control for liberalization
in the labor market. We measure regulation in the labor market using OECD data
on employment protection, replacement rate, bargaining coordination, bargaining
centralization, degree of corporativism and union density. We enter each variable,
lagged once and twice, one at a time. Once again, our conclusions on the long-run
effect of regulation on investment are unaffected. Note also that the labor market
indicators do not have a statistically signi￿cant long-run effect on the sectorial
investment rates. In fact, the sum of the coef￿cients on the ￿rst and second lag
of the labor market indicators is not signi￿cant except when we use data on the
degree of corporativism. In this case, the estimates suggest that an increase in
corporativism reduces investment.18
Our next experiment consists of adding the value added-to-capital ratio, lagged
once and twice, as additional regressors to Model 2 of Table 1. Results for Panel
Ba r ei nT a b l e3 . 19 This speci￿cation can be rationalized as the linear approxima-
tion of a model with quadratic adjustment costs and a Cobb-Douglas production
function.20 The sum of the coef￿cients on the value added to capital terms (Sum2)
18The correlation between our summary measure of regulation REGOL and the union density
and the replacement rate variables is equal 0.18; the correlation between REGOL and the employ-
ment protection index is 0.68, while the correlation between REGOL and the remaining indices
measuring regulation in labor markets is around 0.4.
19For brevity sake, here and in the following tables, we present only the results for Model 2
estimated for Panel B. Results are similar for Model 1 and 3 and for Panel A.
20At each point in time the marginal revenue product of capital equals (α/(1 + ￿))(Y/K),w h e r e
α is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, ￿ as usual is the markup, and Y denotes value
added. Investment will be an increasing function of the present discounted value of the marginal
revenue product of capital (with coef￿cient 1/b, assumed constant for simplicity). Take a linear
approximation of the shadow value of capital around the sample average values of ￿ and Y/K.
Assume then that the markup is a linear function of regulation and that forecasts for regulation and
Y/K are based on a simple bivariate AR(2) system. This would lead to a model of investment that
includes two lagged values of the proxy for regulation and Y/K. N o t ea l s ot h a ta te a c hp o i n ti n
time deregulation increases marginal revenue because it leads to a decrease in the markup. At the
same time, this model would suggest that increased capital intensity is associated with a decrease in
Y/K. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the ￿rst effect should dominate since the investment rate
18are signi￿cant and so are the sum of the coef￿cients for the regulatory indices
REGOL, REGNO,a n dBEVI (Sum1). The size of the effect of deregulation
on investment changes only marginally. Hence, our results are robust when we
control for the effect of changes in output on investment.
If we want to calculate the overall impact of regulation, it is also necessary to
know the effect of regulation on the value added-to-capital ratio. In Table 4 we
present the results obtained when regressing Y/K on two lagged value of itself
and two lagged values of the regulation indices. Interestingly, while one can reject
the joint equality to zero of the regulation coef￿cients, their sum is basically zero
and insigni￿cant. This means that the long-run coef￿cient of regulation in the
investment equation adequately captures its effect.
4.4 Heterogeneity in Short-Run Response
So far we have assumed that the response to regulation is the same across sectors
and countries. We now allow for heterogeneity in short-run responses, while main-
tainingtheassumptionofan identical long-runeffect. We begin byreparametrizing
Model 2 as follows:
 (I/K)ijt = ϑ1 (I/K)ijt−1 + λ1 REGijt−1 + ϑ2(I/K)ijt−2 +
+λ2REGijt−2 + γ i + δ j + ζt + εijt (13)
where ϑ1 = (α1−1), λ1 = β1, ϑ2 = (α1+α2−1), λ2 = (β1+β2),a n dα1, α2, β1,
and β2 are the coef￿cients in equation (12). In equation (13), the long-run effect
of regulation is captured by λ2/ϑ2, while the short-run response depends upon λ1
and ϑ1.We let the coef￿cients λ1 and ϑ1differ across countries or across sectors.
We ￿nd that regulation does not have a statistical signi￿cant effect on investment
in the short-run, in the sense that λ1is not statistically signi￿cant. The only excep-
tion occurs in the speci￿cation in which λ1 differs across sectors and regulation is
measured by REGOLor REGNO. In this case, for the communications sector, a
one unit decrease in REGOLor REGNO leads to an increase in investment as a
share of the capital stock of 0.6 and 0.37 percentage points, respectively, after one
year.21 Second, results on the long-run effect of regulatory reforms on investment
in Table 1 are virtually unchanged when allowing the short-run coef￿cients to dif-
fer across countries (see Table 5, Part I) or across sectors (see Table 5, Part II). In
fact, REGOL, REGNO,a n dBEVI have a negative and statistically signi￿cant
effect (at the 5% level or better) on investment and the size of the coef￿cients is
very close to the one in Table 1. REGPO, instead, is signi￿cant at the 10% level
increases following a deregulation that generates a decrease in the markup.
21Results are not shown and are available upon request.
19only when the coef￿cients ϑ1 and λ1 vary across sectors, but not when they vary
across countries.
4.5 Non-linear Effects of Regulatory Reforms
We now investigate whether there is evidence of a non linear response of invest-
ment to regulatory changes. To start with, we check whether the long-run effect
of regulation on investment depends on the level of regulation itself. In particular,
we add to Model 2, reparametrized as in equation (13), the square of the variable
REGijt−2. Results are reported in Table 6, Part I. For the summary measures of
regulation, REGOL and REGNO,a n df o rBEVI,t h ec o e f ￿cients on the lin-
ear term REGijt−2 remains negative and signi￿cant, while the coef￿cient on the
squaretermispositiveandsigni￿cant at the10%levelfor REGOLand REGNO,
and at the 5% level for BEVI. This implies that regulation has a negative effect
on investment but the magnitude of the effect decreases as the index of regula-
tion increases. Consider, for example, BEVI. The effect of regulation is zero
when BEVI equals 5.68. The effect of regulation on investment is negative for
BEVI < 5.68 and it is positive if BEVI > 5.68. Considering that the maximum
value of BEVI is 6, this result shows that basically regulation has a negative effect
on investment almost for every value of the index and then it ￿attens out.
Another interesting experiment is to see whether the long-run effect of reg-
ulation on investment also depends on the magnitude of the change occurred in
regulation between 1975 and 1998. We interact the variable REGijt−2 in equation
(13) with two dummy variables, LARGE and SMALL. LARGE (SMALL)i s
equal to one if the change in the regulation index between 1975 and 1998 is bigger
(smaller) than the median change in the sample and zero otherwise. Results are
reported in Table 6, Part II. We ￿nd that regulation has a signi￿cant negative effect
on investment both when its change is ￿large￿ and when it is ￿small￿ if we measure
regulation with the overall indices REGOL and REGNO. The effect tends to be
greater for large changes. Instead, the coef￿cient of BEVI is statistically signi￿-
cant at the 5% level only when interacted with the dummy variable LARGE.I ti s
signi￿cant at the 10% when interacted with SMALL. Moreover, the coef￿cient is
greater in the former case (-0.0011 versus -0.0007), implying a long-run effect on
investment of a one unit decrease in BEVI of 0.6 percentage points. The long-run
increase in investment is 0.4 percentage points when the overall decrease in regula-
tion is small. However, a test on the equality of the coef￿cients can only be rejected
at the 7% level. Note also that a decrease in public ownership has a negative and
signi￿cant effect at the 10% level only when governments implemented large scale
privatization programs. Otherwise the effect is insigni￿cant.
Finally, in Table 6 Part III, we investigate whether the timing of regulatory
20reforms matters. More speci￿cally, we check whether deregulation of product
markets positively affects investment both in countries that have undertaken re-
forms early on in the sample and in the ￿late deregulators￿ countries. We de-
￿ne two dummy variables, LATE and EARLY. LATE (EARLY) is equal to
one in countries-sectors where we do not observe (do observe) any decrease in
regulation before 1990 and zero otherwise. As before, we interact the variable
REGijt−2 in equation (13) with the two dummy variables. We ￿nd that deregula-
tion has a negative and statistically signi￿cant effect only when interacted with the
dummy EARLY. In countries-sectors that begin deregulating product markets in
the 1990￿s, a one unit decrease in regulation has no impact on investment. More-
over, the coef￿cient of the dummy variable LATE is negative and statistically
signi￿cant in all speci￿cations except when we use the index REGPO.
Note that one may fail to ￿nd a statistical signi￿cant effect on investment in
￿late deregulators￿ simply because there is not enough variations in the regulation
data. However, it is also the case that countries that were opened up to competition
earlier in the sample are those that deregulated more deeply. Finally, our conclu-
sionsonthelack ofshort-runeffectsstill hold andwedonot￿ndanyconsistent and
robust evidence on short-run effects even when we allow for a non-linear response
of investment to regulation in the short-run.
5 Conclusions
Tight regulation of the product markets has had a large negative effect on invest-
ment. The data for sectors that have experienced signi￿cant changes in the reg-
ulatory environment suggest that deregulation leads to greater investment in the
long-run. The component of reforms that plays the most important role is entry
liberalization, while industry-level measures of privatization do not seem to affect
investment signi￿cantly. This is consistent with what one would expect a priori.
A reduction in entry barriers leads to a reduction of the markup and, hence of the
penalty of expanding production, in terms of lost monopoly pro￿ts. This leads to
greater investment. However, when it comes to public ownership, there are con-
trasting forces at work. While a reduction in public ownership can be seen as a
reduction in the shadow cost of entry, agency problems affecting the behavior of
public managers may lead to over-accumulation of capital. These results are ro-
bust to several sensitivity checks and extensions. Interestingly, we also ￿nd that
the marginal effect of deregulation depends on how deep the change is: more de-
cisive regulatory reforms have a greater marginal impact. Moreover, the marginal
effect is greater when one starts from lower levels of regulation. The implication
of our analysis is clear: regulatory reforms that substantially lower entry barriers
21spur investment.
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25Table 1: Regulation and Investment: Common Year Effects
Panel A
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 1
Sum = β0 + β1 + β2 -0.0018∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0015∗∗ -0.0007∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.0044 0.015 0.0028 0.09
Long−runcoefficient = (β0 + β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.0112 -0.009 -0.0097 -0.005
Pvalue test on H0 : β0 = β1 = β2 = 0 0.04 0.051 0.009 0.16
Nobs 352 352 352 352
Model 2 (β0 = 0)
Sum = β1 + β2 -0.0017∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0016∗∗ -0.0007∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.0042 0.011 0.0013 0.11
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.011 -0.0095 -0.0102 -0.0048
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.016 0.022 0.004 0.10
Nobs 352 352 352 352
Model 3 (β0 = β2 = 0)
β1 -0.0016∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0015∗∗ -0.0005
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = 0 0.0056 0.0062 0.0009 0.244
Long−runcoefficient = β1/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.0113 -0.010 -0.011 -0.004
Nobs 362 362 362 362
Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 1
Sum = β0 + β1 + β2 -0.0012∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0006∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.076
Long−runcoefficient = (β0 + β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004
Pvalue test on H0 : β0 = β1 = β2 = 0 0.028 0.03 0.009 0.24
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Model 2 (β0 = 0)
Sum = β1 + β2 -0.0013∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0006∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.07
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.013 0.02 0.011 0.12
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Model 3 (β0 = β2 = 0)
β1 -0.0012∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0005
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = 0 0.0044 0.007 0.003 0.11
Long−runcoefficient = β1/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.0075 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
Nobs 600 600 600 600
Notes: Dependent variable (I/K)ijt de￿ned as investment divided by the capital stock of countryi,s e c t o rj, yeart.
Regulation indices used: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, and common year dummies are included.






βsREGijt−s + γ i + δ j + ζt + εijt.






βsREGijt−s + γ i + δ j + ζt + εijt.
Model 3: (I/K)ijt =
2 !
s=1
αs(I/K)ijt−s + β1REGijt−1 + γ i + δ j + ζt + εijt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
∗∗ Sum signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l .∗ Sum signi￿cant at the 10% level.Table 2: Regulation and Investment: Sector Speci￿cY e a rE f f e c t s
Panel A
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 1
Sum = β0 + β1 + β2 -0.0015∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0008∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.026 0.10 0.02 0.07
Long−runcoefficient = (β0 + β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006
Pvalue test on H0 : β0 = β1 = β2 = 0 0.17 0.35 0.06 0.13
Nobs 352 352 352 352
Model 2 (β0 = 0)
Sum = β1 + β2 -0.0115∗∗ -0.0011∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0007∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.006
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.08 0.20 0.04 0.08
Nobs 352 352 352 352
Model 3 (β0 = β2 = 0)
β1 -0.00113∗∗ -0.0011∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0005
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = 0 0.035 0.07 0.011 0.21
Long−runcoefficient = β1/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005
Nobs 362 362 362 362
Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 1
Sum = β0 + β1 + β2 -0.0009∗∗ -0.0008∗ -0.0008∗∗ -0.0004
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.16
Long−runcoefficient = (β0 + β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.006 -0.005 -0.0055 -0.003
Pvalue test on H0 : β0 = β1 = β2 = 0 0.24 0.42 0.13 0.39
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Model 2 (β0 = 0)
Sum = β1 + β2 -0.0009∗∗ -0.0008∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0004
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum = 0 0.04 0.09 0.028 0.16
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.12 0.25 0.084 0.23
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Model 3 (β0 = β2 = 0)
β1 -0.0008∗ -0.0007 -0.0007∗∗ -0.0003
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = 0 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.24
Long−runcoefficient = β1/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Nobs 600 600 600 600
Notes: Dependent variable (I/K)ijt de￿ned as investment divided by the capital stock of countryi,s e c t o rj, yeart.
Regulation indices used: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, sector speci￿c year dummies are included.
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βsREGijt−s + γ i + δ j + ζ jt + εijt.
Model 3: (I/K)ijt =
2 !
s=1
αs(I/K)ijt−s + β1REGijt−1 + γ i + δ j + ζ jt + εijt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
∗∗ Sum signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l ;∗ Sum signi￿cant at the 10% level.Table 3: Regulation, Investment and Output
Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
Sum1 = β1 + β2 -0.001∗∗ -0.0007∗ -0.0008∗∗ -0.0005
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum1 = 0 0.025 0.076 0.032 0.118
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.19
Sum2 = ψ1 + ψ2 0.039∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.04∗∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum2 = 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.000
Long−runcoefficient = (ψ1 + ψ2)/(1 − α1 − α2) 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21
Pvalue test on H0 : ψ1 = ψ2 = 0 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0002
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Notes: Dependent variable (I/K)ijt de￿ned as investment divided by the capital stock of countryi,s e c t o rj, yeart.
Regulation indices used: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, and common year dummies are included.









ψs(Y/K)ijt−s + γi + δ j + ζt + εijt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.Y stands for value added.
∗∗ Sum signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l ;∗ Sum signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Table 4: Regulation and Output
Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
Sum1 = β1 + β2 -0.0008∗ -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006∗
Pvalue test on H0 : Sum1 = 0 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.07
Long−runcoefficient = (β1 + β2)/(1 − α1 − α2) -0.036 -0.027 -0.029 -0.028
Pvalue test on H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 0.13 0.04 0.016 0.17
Nobs 631 631 631 631
Notes: Dependent variable (Y/K)ijt de￿ned as value added divided by the capital stock of countryi,s e c t o rj,y e a rt.
Regulation indices used: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, and common year dummies are included.






βsREGijt−s + γi + δ j + ζt + εijt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
∗∗ Sum signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l ;∗ Sum signi￿cant at the 10% level.Table 5: Regulation and Investment: Heterogeneity Across Countries and Sectors
Part I Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
λ2 -0.0012∗∗ -0.0012∗∗ -0.0012∗∗ -0.0005
(-2.78) (-2.93) (-3.20) (-1.62)
ϑ2 -0.171∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.172∗∗
(-7.39) (-7.38) (-7.45) (-7.69)
Long−runcoefficient = −(λ2/ϑ2) -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Part II Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
λ2 -0.0012∗∗ -0.0010∗∗ -0.0009∗∗ -0.0005∗
(-2.80) (-2.41) (-2.58) (-1.78)
ϑ2 -0.155∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.149∗∗
(-6.87) (-6.78) (-6.77) (-6.74)
Long−runcoefficient = −(λ2/ϑ2) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Notes: Estimation of Model 2 reparametrized as follows:
 (I/K)ijt = ϑ1 (I/K)ijt−1 + λ1 REGijt−1 + ϑ2(I/K)ijt−2 + λ2REGijt−2 + γi + δ j + ζt + εijt.
(I/K)ijt de￿ned as investment divided by the capital stock of countryi, sector j,y e a rt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
ϑ1,λ1 differ across countries in Part I and across sectors in Part II.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, and common year dummies are included.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗∗ coef￿cients signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l ;∗ coef￿cients signi￿cant at the 10% level.Table 6: Regulation and Investment: Nonlinearities
Part I: Level and Square of Regulation Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
REG -0.0048∗∗ -0.0046∗∗ -0.0045∗∗ -0.002
(-2.50) (￿2.45) (-2.97) (-1.39)
REG2 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0002
(1.89) (1.92) (2.33) (1.03)
ϑ2 -0.171∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.156∗∗
(-7.32) (-7.19) (-7.25) (-6.82)
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Part II: Size of Change in Regulation Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
REG∗ LARGE -0.0014∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0006∗
(-3.19) (￿2.65) (-3.02) (-1.89)
REG∗ SMALL -0.0011∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0007∗ -0.00003
(-2.48) (-2.33) (-1.83) (-0.09)
ϑ2 -0.171∗∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.165∗∗
(-7.27) (-6.94) (-7.24) (-7.15)
Pvalue test on H0 : λL
2 = λS
2 0.09 0.71 0.07 0.02
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Part III: Timing of Changes in Regulation Panel B
REGOL REGNO BEVI REGPO
Model 2
REG∗ LATE -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(-0.12) (-0.83) (-0.81) (-1.18)
REG∗ EARLY -0.0023∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0013∗∗
(-4.35) (-3.69) (-4.17) (-2.79)
ϑ2 -0.189∗∗ -0.176∗∗ -0.181∗∗ -0.182∗∗
(-7.91) (-7.46) (-7.63) (-7.54)
η0 -0.009∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.005∗ -0.001
(-2.49) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-0.44)
Pvalue test on H0 : λLA
2 = λEA
2 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.07
Nobs 578 578 578 578
Notes: Part I: Model 2 reparametrized as follows:  (I/K)ijt = ϑ1 (I/K)ijt−1 + λ1 REGijt−1+
+ϑ2(I/K)ijt−2 + λ2REGijt−2 + λ3REG2
ijt−2 + γi + δ j + ζt + εijt.
Part II: Model 2 reparametrized as follows:  (I/K)ijt = ϑ1 (I/K)ijt−1 + λ1 REGijt−1+
+ϑ2(I/K)ijt−2 + λL
2 REGijt−2(LARGE) + λS
2 REGijt−2(SMALL) + γ i + δ j + ζt + εijt.
Part III: Model 2 reparametrized as follows:  (I/K)ijt = ϑ1 (I/K)ijt−1 + λ1 REGijt−1+
+ϑ2(I/K)ijt−2 + λLA
2 REGijt−2(LATE) + λEA
2 REGijt−2(EARLY) + η0LATE+ γi + δ j + ζt + εijt.
(I/K)ijt de￿ned as investment divided by the capital stock of countryi, sector j,y e a rt.
REGstands for one of the following: REGOL, REGNO, BEVI, REGPO.
LARGE(SMALL) is equal to one if the change in the regulation index between 1975 and 1998 is
bigger (smaller) than the median change in the sample and zero otherwise.
LATE(EARLY) is a dummy variable equal to one if the regulation index begun decreasing
before (after) 1990 zero otherwise.
Country ￿xed effects, sector ￿xed effects, and common year dummies are included.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗∗ coef￿cients signi￿c a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e l ; ∗ coef￿cients signi￿cant at the 10% level.Figure 1: Regulation 1975 - 1998
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